discourse/app/models/concerns/second_factor_manager.rb
Rafael dos Santos Silva 99ce75a01c
FEATURE: Allow passkeys to satisfy 2FA on /session/2fa (#39674)
Previously, the 2FA confirmation page accepted only TOTP, backup codes,
or physical security keys, so users who logged in with a passkey had no
way to use that same credential for sensitive-action confirmation.

Behind the new `allow_passkeys_for_2fa` site setting, this change lets a
passkey satisfy a 2FA challenge and auto-triggers the WebAuthn prompt on
page load so a single OS dialog confirms the action.
2026-05-06 14:47:01 -03:00

290 lines
8.2 KiB
Ruby

# frozen_string_literal: true
module SecondFactorManager
TOTP_ALLOWED_DRIFT_SECONDS = 30
extend ActiveSupport::Concern
SecondFactorAuthenticationResult =
Struct.new(
:ok,
:error,
:reason,
:backup_enabled,
:security_key_enabled,
:totp_enabled,
:multiple_second_factor_methods,
:used_2fa_method,
)
def create_totp(opts = {})
require_rotp
UserSecondFactor.create!(
{
user_id: self.id,
method: UserSecondFactor.methods[:totp],
data: ROTP::Base32.random,
}.merge(opts),
)
end
def get_totp_object(data)
require_rotp
ROTP::TOTP.new(data, issuer: SiteSetting.title.gsub(":", ""))
end
def totp_provisioning_uri(data)
get_totp_object(data).provisioning_uri(self.email)
end
def authenticate_totp(token)
totps = self.user_second_factors&.totps
authenticated = false
totps.each do |totp|
last_used = 0
last_used = totp.last_used.to_i if totp.last_used
authenticated =
token.present? &&
totp.totp_object.verify(
token,
drift_ahead: TOTP_ALLOWED_DRIFT_SECONDS,
drift_behind: TOTP_ALLOWED_DRIFT_SECONDS,
after: last_used,
)
if authenticated
totp.update!(last_used: DateTime.now)
break
end
end
!!authenticated
end
def totp_enabled?
!SiteSetting.enable_discourse_connect && SiteSetting.enable_local_logins &&
self.user_second_factors&.totps&.exists?
end
def backup_codes_enabled?
!SiteSetting.enable_discourse_connect && SiteSetting.enable_local_logins &&
self.user_second_factors&.backup_codes&.exists?
end
def security_keys_enabled?
!SiteSetting.enable_discourse_connect && SiteSetting.enable_local_logins &&
self
.security_keys
&.where(factor_type: UserSecurityKey.factor_types[:second_factor], enabled: true)
&.exists?
end
def passkeys_for_2fa_enabled?
SiteSetting.allow_passkeys_for_2fa && SiteSetting.enable_passkeys &&
!SiteSetting.enable_discourse_connect && SiteSetting.enable_local_logins &&
self.security_keys&.where(factor_type: UserSecurityKey.factor_types[:first_factor])&.exists?
end
# Passkey-as-2FA (`passkeys_for_2fa_enabled?`) is intentionally excluded:
# it only satisfies `/session/2fa`. Password login, email login, and password
# reset have no passkey UI yet, so counting passkeys here would make those
# flows skip 2FA for passkey-only users.
def has_any_second_factor_methods_enabled?
totp_enabled? || security_keys_enabled?
end
def has_multiple_second_factor_methods?
security_keys_enabled? && totp_or_backup_codes_enabled?
end
def totp_or_backup_codes_enabled?
totp_enabled? || backup_codes_enabled?
end
def only_security_keys_enabled?
security_keys_enabled? && !totp_or_backup_codes_enabled?
end
def only_totp_or_backup_codes_enabled?
!security_keys_enabled? && totp_or_backup_codes_enabled?
end
def remaining_backup_codes
self.user_second_factors&.backup_codes&.count
end
def authenticate_second_factor(params, server_session)
ok_result = SecondFactorAuthenticationResult.new(true)
if !security_keys_enabled? && !totp_or_backup_codes_enabled? &&
(!passkeys_for_2fa_enabled? || params[:second_factor_method].blank?)
return ok_result
end
second_factor_token = params[:second_factor_token]
second_factor_method = params[:second_factor_method]&.to_i
if second_factor_method.blank? || UserSecondFactor.methods[second_factor_method].blank?
return invalid_second_factor_method_result
end
if !valid_second_factor_method_for_user?(second_factor_method)
return not_enabled_second_factor_method_result
end
case second_factor_method
when UserSecondFactor.methods[:totp]
if authenticate_totp(second_factor_token)
ok_result.used_2fa_method = UserSecondFactor.methods[:totp]
return ok_result
else
return invalid_totp_or_backup_code_result
end
when UserSecondFactor.methods[:backup_codes]
if authenticate_backup_code(second_factor_token)
ok_result.used_2fa_method = UserSecondFactor.methods[:backup_codes]
return ok_result
else
return invalid_totp_or_backup_code_result
end
when UserSecondFactor.methods[:security_key]
if authenticate_security_key(server_session, second_factor_token)
ok_result.used_2fa_method = UserSecondFactor.methods[:security_key]
return ok_result
else
return invalid_security_key_result
end
end
# if we have gotten down to this point without being
# OK or invalid something has gone very weird.
invalid_second_factor_method_result
rescue ::DiscourseWebauthn::SecurityKeyError => err
invalid_security_key_result(err.message)
end
def valid_second_factor_method_for_user?(method)
case method
when UserSecondFactor.methods[:totp]
return totp_enabled?
when UserSecondFactor.methods[:backup_codes]
return backup_codes_enabled?
when UserSecondFactor.methods[:security_key]
return security_keys_enabled? || passkeys_for_2fa_enabled?
end
false
end
def authenticate_security_key(server_session, security_key_credential)
factor_types = [UserSecurityKey.factor_types[:second_factor]]
factor_types << UserSecurityKey.factor_types[:first_factor] if passkeys_for_2fa_enabled?
::DiscourseWebauthn::AuthenticationService.new(
self,
security_key_credential,
session: server_session,
factor_type: factor_types,
).authenticate_security_key
end
def invalid_totp_or_backup_code_result
invalid_second_factor_authentication_result(
I18n.t("login.invalid_second_factor_code"),
"invalid_second_factor",
)
end
def invalid_security_key_result(error_message = nil)
invalid_second_factor_authentication_result(
error_message || I18n.t("login.invalid_security_key"),
"invalid_security_key",
)
end
def invalid_second_factor_method_result
invalid_second_factor_authentication_result(
I18n.t("login.invalid_second_factor_method"),
"invalid_second_factor_method",
)
end
def not_enabled_second_factor_method_result
invalid_second_factor_authentication_result(
I18n.t("login.not_enabled_second_factor_method"),
"not_enabled_second_factor_method",
)
end
def invalid_second_factor_authentication_result(error_message, reason)
SecondFactorAuthenticationResult.new(
false,
error_message,
reason,
backup_codes_enabled?,
security_keys_enabled?,
totp_enabled?,
has_multiple_second_factor_methods?,
)
end
def generate_backup_codes
codes = []
10.times { codes << SecureRandom.hex(16) }
codes_json =
codes.map do |code|
salt = SecureRandom.hex(16)
{ salt: salt, code_hash: hash_backup_code(code, salt) }
end
if self.user_second_factors.backup_codes.empty?
create_backup_codes(codes_json)
else
self.user_second_factors.where(method: UserSecondFactor.methods[:backup_codes]).destroy_all
create_backup_codes(codes_json)
end
codes
end
def create_backup_codes(codes)
codes.each do |code|
UserSecondFactor.create!(
user_id: self.id,
data: code.to_json,
enabled: true,
method: UserSecondFactor.methods[:backup_codes],
)
end
end
def authenticate_backup_code(backup_code)
if backup_code.present?
codes = self.user_second_factors&.backup_codes
codes.each do |code|
parsed_data = JSON.parse(code.data)
stored_code = parsed_data["code_hash"]
stored_salt = parsed_data["salt"]
backup_hash = hash_backup_code(backup_code, stored_salt)
next unless backup_hash == stored_code
code.update(enabled: false, last_used: DateTime.now)
return true
end
false
end
false
end
def hash_backup_code(code, salt)
# Backup codes have high entropy, so we can afford to use
# a lower number of iterations than for user-specific passwords
iterations = Rails.env.test? ? 10 : 64_000
Pbkdf2.hash_password(code, salt, iterations, "sha256")
end
def require_rotp
require "rotp" if !defined?(ROTP)
end
end